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ABSTRACT
Generally studies on pribumi and Chinese relationship in Indonesia are dominated with 
conflict perspectives. In fact, in practice, the relationship between the two groups can be very dynamic. 
Amongst social tension arose between them, there are often stories about social harmony, social 
engagement and social cohesion. This is also what we found in the Minang-Chinese relationship 
in Padang, West Sumatra. The Minang-Chinese relationship in Padang, West Sumatra, in current 
period has been not only about social tension. In spite of the strong tension arose due to differences in 
ethnicity and religious belief, they are strongly tied in running local trading, political party, and other 
areas of public policy making. Competition in economy often stands together with cooperation. This 
similarly works in local politics, and, recently, community recovery post 2009-earthquake. Such 
dynamic relationships is inseparable from ethnic politics constructed throughout Padang history 
in the past. This paper sees that the relationships of Minang and Chinese are inseparable from the 
ethnic politics constructed throughout Padang history. This paper tries to portray briefly the journey 
of Minang and Chinese relationship in Padang and the politics that contextualizes the making of that 
relationship based on literature research and in-depth interviews. Despite its shortness, this paper is 
supposed to provide background information for those interested in discussing the issue of ethnicity 
in Padang and West Sumatra. 
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INTRODUCTION
Pribumi and Chinese relationship in the 
studies of ethnic politics in Indonesia is usually 
portrayed as full of conflict. In fact, the relationship 
between the two could be very dynamics. This can 
be found for example in the Minang and Chinese 
relationships in Padang, West Sumatra. Although 
the relationship between the two is sometime 
described as full of tensions (Olszewska, 2010), 
but they are quite often to get involved in collective 
works and social engagement. In scrutinizing this 
phenomenon, it becomes important to take into 
account the political context that tells us much 
about ethnic politics constructed throughout the 
history of the community. This article confirms that 
the relationship between the Minang and Chinese 
is inseparable from what they have been through 
throughout Padang history. Not only surrounded 
by tension, the Minang and Chinese have also 
experienced of cooperation, such as that during 
Revolution era in the 1950s. This seems to repeat 
in current the Minang and Chinese relationship, 
in which amidst the tension caused by religious 
difference and economic competition. The two 
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ethnic groups have also been deeply engaged 
in post-2009 earthquake collective recovery. In 
this context, tracing the political context that is 
manifested through ethnic politics constructed 
during Padang’s history becomes important. 
As Derks and Roymans (2009, p. 1) argue, 
the construction of ethnic has close association 
with political system. This can also be found in 
the Minang and Chinese relationship in Padang. 
Throughout Padang history, we can see that the 
ups and downs in the Minang-Chinese relationship 
often linked to political structure in national and 
local level. This includes the periods of prior 
independence era (up to 1945), Revolution era 
(1945-1965/1966), New Order (1965/1966-1998), 
and Reformasi (1998). Throughout these periods 
we can see politics matter in the Minang-Chinese 
relationship construct. 
However, it is not Minang if we do not find 
out adaptability and tactics to survive in the hardest 
times. Minang never become the passive recipient 
of their ‘political’ fate. As Hadler (2009) argues, 
Minang outweighs survival than anything else in 
their culture. This can be clearly seen, for instance, 
in reformasi era, where, unlike many other big 
cities in Indonesia, violence against Chinese did 
not happen in Padang. Although the Minang and 
Chinese relationship can be said to be not strongly 
engaged for ethnic and religious differences, as 
well as for economic competition (Olszewska, 
2010), the absence of violence during reformasi is 
interesting to discuss. 
This reminds us of Arifin’s work of dualism 
in Minangkabau society, in which the Minang do 
not express directly their refusal or acceptance 
of Chinese. This contradiction is maintained in 
order to avoid conflict (2012, p. 29). If we refer to 
Sairin (1995, p. 91), this can also reflect the culture 
of democracy Minang maintained since ancient 
time, in which the Minang prefers diplomacy and 
dialogues, rather than conflict and violence in 
dealing with their matters. By tracing the Minang 
and Chinese relationship period to period, as this 
article tries to do, we will see how politics work 
in constructing interethnic relationship in Padang, 
West Sumatra. Nevertheless, we will also be 
reminded that Minang and Chinese are not passive 
recipient of their ‘political’ fate. 
This article uses literature reviews and in-
depth interviews as methods for data collection. 
The literatures in this study include research report 
and manuscripts. In-depth interviews involve about 
15 informants from both Minang and Chinese. 
Most informants are elderly who experience the 
first hand of the Padang history, and some of them 
are academics who have concerns on the Minang 
and Chinese relations. 
THE RISE OF ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION: 
FROM 15TH CENTURY TO 1945
There is no consensus among social science 
scholars focusing on West Sumatra about the initial 
coming of Chinese to Padang, including the issues 
of who exactly initiated it, when it started, and 
how it happened. Some scholars mentioned that 
Chinese migration to West Sumatra, especially to 
Padang, is inseparable from the development of 
Padang to be a trading city, especially after VOC 
entered Padang, as well as the colonial government 
policy to expand their trading zones (Asnan, 2002, 
p. 728, Dobbin, 1983, Abdullah in Soebadio and
Sarvaas, 1978, p. 205, Erniwati, 2011, p. 37 and 
44). Colombijn (2004, p. 249 and 2006, p. 55) 
proposes the same argument that Chinese appeared 
to be in Padang since VOC opened its commerce 
centre in that city in 1664 after defeating Aceh 
that had ruled most Sumatran regions including 
West Sumatra in 15-16 Century. Indeed, Padang 
had been a migration destination and trading 
centre long before the coming of VOC, but the 
role of VOC in making Padang more attractive 
than in previous time is also very clear. The more 
economically active Padang since the coming of 
VOC had attracted migrants to come, including 
Arabians, Indians, Niasnese and Javanese. 
Yet, some other scholars believed that Chinese 
had made a connection with Padang inhabitants 
long before the coming of VOC. The fall down 
of Malaka Kingdom to the hand of Portuguese 
government in 1511 had made the West Coast of 
Sumatra getting more hectic (Erniwati, 2011, p. 44, 
Hadi, 2004, p. 29). The change of ruler had made 
the change in Sumatran trading zone—which was 
mainly supported by sea transportation mode—to 
be more open to foreign traders. At that moment, 
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West Sumatra that produced a lot of pepper was 
still under Aceh’s ruler (Kathirithamby-Wells, 
1969, pp. 453-479), and it was Pariaman, and not 
Padang, that became the center of West Sumatra, 
because Pariaman was noted to have big seaports. 
Padang, and other cities in West Sumatra, like 
Painan, as Colombijn (p. 57) argues, was the 
secondary important city after Pariaman in West 
Coast. Therefore, it is not a surprise when I found 
that most Chinese Padang I interviewed admitted 
that their origins are from Pariaman and, some 
are from, Painan. Considering such a geography 
politics, at first, Aceh ruler did not count the 
takeover of Padang by Minangkabau people 
in cooperation with VOC important. With the 
establishment of VOC commerce centre in Padang, 
Padang turned to be very attractive for outside 
traders (Brown, 2011, p. 47 and 67), including 
for Chinese. This is not to mention some political 
upheavals in Pariaman, which partially said to be 
caused by sentiment, as well as natural disasters, 
like 1926 earthquake, that later killed Pariaman’s 
economy that highly relied on foreigners and 
seaports. The plural face of Padang identified with 
the existence of minority ethnic groups, including 
Chinese, Indians, Arabians, Bataknese, Javanese, 
Jambinese, and so forth. 
During colonial era, the situation became 
very dynamic and challenging because the colonial 
government directly interfered the politics of 
ethnics through its ethnic policy. Social and 
political tension in Padang was begun when the 
takeover of Padang by the Minang and VOC 
from Aceh did not leave space for the Minang to 
participate in trading control. VOC dominated it 
and, of course, it encouraged the Minang struggle 
against VOC. Colombijn (2006, p. 56-58) said, 
instead of making the Minang as equal partner in 
trading, VOC put them as their employees. Yet, 
the Minang is not kind of lenient people (Dobbin, 
1977). The harder VOC forced Minang to supply 
gold and peppers, the harder the resistance of 
Minang towards VOC. The Minang resistance 
had hit gold and pepper market in Europe, and 
thus meant a big loss for VOC. Padang gained 
a big pressure from village people surrounding 
the city. Yet, European and Chinese traders had 
been successfully defended it (p. 57). The loss of 
VOC, in addition to the loss of Dutch in France-
Dutch war in 1793-1795 had brought Dutch to 
be under France’s ruler. The loss of France in 
war against Britain had brought East Indies, 
including Padang, under Britain’s ruler. In 1814 
Britain returned Padang to Dutch, and in 1819, 
Padang was no longer made as commerce centre 
for VOC, its status instead was changed to be the 
colonized area for the Dutch government. The West 
Sumatran export commodities were no longer gold 
and pepper, but coffee. In that matter, Chinese, 
together with British, and Dutchman operate local 
commerce houses that were connected with traders 
in India, Penang and Singapore (Colombijn, 2006, 
p. 61).
From the above discussion, we can see that 
although not holding the main control of Padang 
politics and economy, Chinese played crucial role 
in the running of Padang governance and trading. 
They remained gaining an important place in 
Padang local economy apart from the up and down 
of the colonial ruler’s power due to European wars. 
Although being counted as the second class citizen, 
Chinese enjoyed the citizenship status given by the 
colonial government. They were also allowed to 
govern their community members with their own 
Chinese ruler – indeed under the control of the 
colonial government (Colombijn, 1995, p. 264). 
The counting of Chinese as an important 
part in Padang’s colonial governance is also 
strengthened with the colonial policy of population 
stratification (Soewarsono, 2000, p. 145-148) – 
which implies the differentiation of population’s 
rights and compulsions, i. e. in education, health, 
and economy accesses. The colonial government 
formally divided population as the following:
1) The  first c lass  c i t i zen  inc luded
E u r o p e a n s .
2) The second class citizen included
foreigners other than European like
Arabians, Chinese, and Indians, called
Timur Jauh.
3) The third class citizen included local
ethnics (pribumi), consisting of native
Minang and new comers, like Javanese,
Jambinese, Bataknese, and Niasnese.
As the manifestation of the policy of population 
stratification, the colonial government issued some 
policies that for most Indonesian scholars were 
considered as biased. In addition to privileging 
Humaniora, Vol. 28, No. 1 Februari 2016
82
Europeans in education, health and economy, 
the colonial government also issued formal 
permission for Chinese to enter Padang freely in 
1900 (Mackie and Coppel, 1976), as a basic token 
of that stratification policy. Indeed, the wave of 
Chinese migration to Padang had occurred prior 
1900. Yet, economic expansion had encouraged 
the colonial government to push migration of 
foreigner, especially Chinese, in Padang. Chinese 
was also allowed to grouping with their fellow 
Chinese along the valleys of Gunung Padang and 
Batang Arau river, which means a closer access 
to transportation facilities, forming what current 
people call as “Kampung Cina”, which is usually 
called Pondok. Living near the main river in 
Padang meant a lot for Chinese because it enclosed 
their access to the centers of economy and to 
transportation facilities. 
There were also some public facilities in that 
Pondok including, for instance, temple (kelenteng) 
and traditional market, which could be counted 
as privileges for the second-class citizen like 
Chinese. Currently, building Church and houses 
for minority ethnic groups like Chinese and Batak 
are counted as hard issues in Padang, therefore the 
permission to build temple and traditional market 
in colonial era could be deemed as crucial facilities 
that Chinese could gain. Chinese temple and 
traditional market were situated side by side in the 
center of community in order to ease their access 
and mobility. When the temple was burnt in 1861, 
the shops in the market, which were made up from 
bamboos, were then rented to other traders in order 
to cover the credit Chinese born to rebuild it. The 
market is called Pasar Tanah Kongsi. Because of 
that renting policy, Tanah Kongsi became plural. 
The traders not only included Chinese, but also 
Minangkabau, and the buyers included Chinese, 
Indische, high-class the Minang, and European 
women (Erniwati, 2011, p. 55). The mixture of 
ethnicities in sellers and buyers in Pasar Tanah 
Kongsi has made the market as one of the most 
plural and ethnically open market in Padang. The 
decision to rent bamboo shops and counters in 
Pasar Tanah Kongsi seemed to be the foundation 
for the current encounters of the Chinese and the 
Minang and of course other minority ethnic groups 
in Padang. Because of this small, yet crucial role of 
Pasar Tanah Kongsi in building Padang plurality, 
Pasar Tanah Kongsi took crucial part in my 
analysis of Minang and Chinese solidarity in the 
later discussions. 
In addition to privilege for establishing 
social group based on residential area, there is 
also privilege for establishing social organizations 
wi th in  in te rna l  Chinese .  Among soc ia l 
organizations within Chinese, there is one that is 
the most important to mention, namely “kongsi”. 
There are many Chinese organizations in Padang, 
including family organization (marga), dialect 
organizations, clan organization, and kampung 
organization. However, kongsi is the most crucial 
one because of its social function, as well as its 
strategic position in Padang local politics. The 
meaning of kongsi originally refers to trading 
communion, but in Padang it was developed to 
be cultural organization. In Padang kongsi refers 
to funeral communion, in which membership is 
determined by choice and only for men since the 
men age about 17. There are two kongsi, namely 
Hok Teek Tong (HTT) with Indonesian name 
“Himpunan Tjinta Teman” and Heng Beng Tong 
(HBT) with Indonesian name “Himpunan Bersatu 
Teguh” formed in 19th century. The membership 
is fixed, so that changing it to another kongsi 
is prohibited. Membership contains rights and 
obligations, including for instance monthly fees, 
of which amount is ten thousand rupiah—as per 
May 2014; a period of my third fieldwork, a right 
of getting free of charge fee for men aging 60 
or above, called as pension age, and social aids, 
like assistance for the sick members and aids for 
reconstruction post-2009 earthquake. Although the 
political role of kongsi had not yet been very clear, 
in current Padang politics, kongsi has been a bridge 
that connects Chinese with policy makers that are 
mostly the Minang. Some kongsi leaders are also 
local politicians. In later discussion, we can see 
how important kongsi is in the construction of 
the Minang and Chinese solidarity, including post 
2009 earthquake recovery.
Other privileges Chinese, as the second-class 
citizen, gained were facilities to education access. 
Erniwati (2011, p. 56) calls it as equalization, 
meant to be an engineering of social structure 
to encourage Chinese to be by-education equal 
to Europeans. Access to education for Chinese, 
however, is inseparable with evangelization 
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mission. Most schools provided for Chinese 
were those affiliated with the churches. Schools, 
therefore, did not only function as a place for 
education, but also for religious promotion. 
Colonialism and Chinese, as such, are inseparable 
from the explanation of Christianity development 
in Padang and West Sumatra, in general. Although 
political economy might be crucial in pushing the 
integration of Chinese with Europeans’ religious 
belief, but this needs further study to elaborate. 
The colonial government, however, did 
not only apply equalization policy. They also 
applied assimilation policy to Chinese, meant to 
connect Chinese with local residents. Indeed, this 
has nothing to do with the colonial intension for 
building social cohesion and integration. Rather, 
this was to help colonial government to have 
connection with local residents for the sake of 
colonial benefit. Erniwati (2011, p. 57) mentions 
that the colonial government relied on Chinese 
in terms of making contact with local residents. 
Trading connection and tax collection were among 
the areas the colonial government devoted to 
Chinese to deal with.  It is clearly that the policy 
seems to be a double-edges sword in the sense that 
it appeared as if it accommodated Chinese to make 
connection with pribumi, but actually it was used 
to protect colonial interest. 
The implication of such a double-edges policy 
can be looked, for instance, in the rebellion of 
Minangkabau towards the colonial government in 
1908, which is related to forced coffee plantation 
policy (Koffeecultuur) and coffee taxation system. 
The policy did not only encourage anti-Europeans 
among Minang, but also anti-Chinese. The 
involvement of Chinese in tax collection and other 
bureaucratic functions had worsened the Minang’s 
impression and acceptance towards Chinese. 
Minang 1908 rebellion is mentioned to be the 
culmination of the Minang dissatisfaction towards 
the colonial government (Kahin, 2005, p. 11) not 
only for having undermined the Minang in the 
policy of koffeecultuur, but also for giving Chinese 
privilege to get involved within the implementation 
of the policy. Other issues included the placing of 
adat institution (Kerapatan Adat Nagari) as the 
lowest part of the colonial government structure, 
religious sentiment, in which Europeans and 
Chinese were known to be mostly non-Muslim, 
and discrimination, in which Chinese was given 
privileges than the Minang in terms of residency 
and economy. The discrimination and exploitative 
policy designs in social, economy and politics in 
the colonial era have inhibited the tension between 
communities that originated from different ethnic 
groups. Until independence in 1945, such a tension 
did not mean to erode. It was even strengthened, 
given the harder situation communities had to 
face for the political and economic instabilities in 
transition era. 
A “SWEET” RELATIONSHIP: REVOLUTION 
ERA (1945-1965/1966)
During the first periods of post-1945 
independence, Indonesia in general faced political 
instability, which was not only influential to the 
people’s political life, but also to their social 
relations, such as in interethnic relationships in 
grass root level. Regionalisms, ideology friction 
among nationalist, religious and communist 
party (known to be “Nasakom”, an abbreviation 
of “Nasional, “Agama”, and “Komunis”), hard 
competition of power among the elites in national 
and local levels, and instability in economy are of 
factors that shaped the messy faces of Indonesian 
politics in that transition era. Such a hard situation 
also occurred in Padang, and was similarly 
influential to the relationship between different 
ethnic groups in daily life. The case of PRRI in 
19502-1960s, which was followed with anti-
communist movement in 1960s-1970s, is among 
the most crucial manifestations of those political 
complexities. Both PRRI and anti-communist 
movements later influenced much the political 
position of West Sumatra in Indonesian political 
landscape during New Order and Reformasi 
era, which was followed with complexities in 
interethnic relations in grass root level. Because 
of PRRI movement, the Minang gained the ‘red 
stamp’ labelling – meant to be a rebel – from the 
Indonesian government—which was dominated 
by Javanese. This stamp resulted in an exclusion 
of the Minang from politics and economy access 
in Indonesian bureaucracy. In daily life, tension 
between the Minang, Chinese and Javanese was 
unavoidable. The situation got worse when Padang 
entered anti-PKI era (Indonesian Communist Party 
or Partai Komunis Indonesia) in 1960s, worsened 
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the relationship of the Minang and Chinese that 
was already distancing because of colonialism 
and PRRI movement. The following discussions 
present briefly PRRI and anti-PKI movements in 
Padang in Revolution era and their influences with 
interethnic relations in grass root level, which is 
useful to be the background information for current 
the Minang and Chinese relationship.
PRRI is an abbreviation for Pemerintah 
Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary 
Government of the Indonesian Republic). PRRI 
is a movement that was established to respond to 
the increasing role of PKI in national government 
(Ricklefs, 2001, p. 319), which at the same 
time coincided with the culminating problem of 
inequality in resource and power access in national 
and local decision making creating the so called 
Java and non-Java sentiment, and the growing 
corruption in government bodies (Syamdani, 2009, 
p. 39-47). PRRI proclaimed its establishment on 15 
February 1958 in Padang. There were five demands 
proposed to Soekarno by PRRI supporters (Asnan, 
2007, pp. 189-190), including the following points:
1) To reshuffle Indonesian ministries under 
Djuanda Cabinet within 5 x 24 hours;
2) To point out Hatta and Hamengku 
Buwono IX to form new ministries;
3) To let new ministries to work until the 
next general elections;
4) To suggest President Soekarno to act 
only based on Constitution (that asserted 
parliamentary system); 
5) If the demands were not fulfilled, there 
will be an action taken to respond to it. 
Ricklefs (2001, p. 318) and Setiyono (2008, 
pp. 788-789) argued that the movement gained 
crucial backup from the United Stated, which 
Soekarno and PKI worried most about. Among 
the prominent national figures in PRRI included 
Sjafrudin, M. Natsir, Burhanudin Harahap, 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and Simbolon. The 
local figures included Ahmad Husein, a military 
commander of Region IV (West Sumatra), Dahlan 
Djambek, another military commander (Syamdani, 
2009, p. 73) and Djamaloe’ddin Wak Ketok 
(Singgalang, 2000, in Syamdani, 2009, p. 104). 
The proclamation of PRRI had resulted in the firing 
of Ahmad Husein from his position as military 
officer (Colombijn 2006, p. 169, Wertheim, 1959, 
pp. 359-360). Another PRRI supporter figure, 
namely Sumitro, was noted to flee abroad. But, 
until today it remains unclear whether PRRI was 
truly a mutual collaboration between national 
and local politicians that were dissatisfied of 
Soekarno’s leadership on the one hand, and of 
unequal welfare distribution on the other hand, or 
merely a making use of local resource by national 
politicians to support their political goal. A Minang 
leading figure I interviewed asserts that Minang 
was basically not interested in the movement. It 
was just Husein’s action that did not represent 
Minang’s political stance in general. He said, 
Ahmad Husein is the chief of the struggle. 
The Prime Minister of PRRI was Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, and the ministers were 
national politicians. No one was from here 
(Padang, West Sumatra). The top position 
of PRRI was held by Ahmad Husein, which 
was not even becoming PRRI minister.1
Dealing with PRRI movement,  there 
are at least two mainstreaming views that are 
important to discuss, namely separatism view and 
regionalism view. The separatism view perceives 
PRRI as a movement that aims to disintegrate from 
Indonesia. It has a close meaning with rebellion 
(pemberontakan). Regionalism is a movement that 
has regional orientation and coverage meant to be 
a protest or correction to the central government. 
The Indonesian government is among those 
that consider PRRI as a separatism movement 
(Syamdani, 2009, pp. 3-5). Scholars like Saafrudin 
Bahar and some other Minang leading figures are 
amongst those who consider PRRI as regionalism 
(Syamdani, 2009, p. 11). 
Those who see PRRI as regionalism see PRRI 
movement as part of the critiques from the people 
in local region to the national government for 
particular problems and policies. The exploitation 
of West Sumatran resources,2 especially in coffee, 
pepper and coal mining, and the tendency of 
the national government to get closer to the left 
ideology (communism) represented by PKI that 
was rejected by most leading figures in Minang 
(Syamdani, 2009, p. 5, Ricklefs, 2001, p. 319) that 
were closer to Masyumi and PSI, are among the 
core issues frequently mentioned to have relations 
with the movement.3 Those people see PRRI just 
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as a way to ask for more justice to the national 
government. He said, 
What the Minang wanted was equal 
distribution in economy. (For the Minang) 
it seemed that the government focused 
too much on Java. Meanwhile, since 
contributing in Indonesian economy, the 
Minang wanted welfare, as well. 4
Such a view was supported by scholars 
like Brown (2011, p. 188), who asserts that the 
movement was neither supposed to be separatism 
movement nor to delegitimize Soekarno. It aimed 
to seek for the supports for reform. In addition to 
regional sentiment, religion seems to also play 
crucial role in encouraging the movement. Natsir 
is among the leaders who believed that PRRI had 
relation to jihad for fighting against ideology that 
was contrary to Islam (communism). Kamardi 
Rais, a senior Minang journalist, in his biography 
mentioned about Natsir quoting Qur’anic verses 
and Hadist to encourage PRRI activists, which was 
listened respectfully and very carefully (Refrisul 
and Efrianto, 2013, p. 34)
Some supporters of regionalism view see that 
separatism (pemberontakan) attribution attached 
to PRRI was merely of PKI’s propaganda that 
was unhappy with the existence of PSI (Partai 
Sosialis  Indonesia—Indonesian Socialist Party) 
and Masyumi in the Indonesian government that 
was operated through the parliamentary system 
at the moment. It is widely known that PSI and 
Masyumi were among those that were actively 
against PKI in Indonesian political stage. With 
its separatism propaganda on PRRI, PKI meant 
to use military to attack its political rivals (PSI 
and Masyumi) (Syamdani, 2009), although later 
it is found that it was military that made use of 
PKI to regain its influence before Soekarno in 
order to regain its power in Indonesian political 
contestation (Anderson and McVey, 2009, p. 26). 
On the other hand, PKI saw that PRRI was merely 
its political rivals’ manoeuvres that were supported 
by the United States to reduce Soekarno and PKI’s 
role in Indonesian politics that was known to be 
very close to communism (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 319). 
Attack on pro-PRRI was supposed to show that 
Indonesia was not allied to the US. Later, the US 
withdrew its support to PRRI rebels to moderate 
anti-US sentiment in Indonesian government. 
Anderson and McVey’s argument later seems 
to be proven, that it was military that made use of 
PKI instead of the other way around, which can 
be seen from the replacement of PKI-affiliated 
bureaucrats and leftist military officers in Padang 
with anti-PKI bureaucrats and military officer 
figures after PRRI defeated, and its activists 
were jailed until 1961 (Feith, 1962, pp. 525-531, 
Colombijn, 2006, p. 193). As such, leftist and 
PKI-affiliated officers enjoyed strategic position 
in government very shortly only during PRRI 
struggling era (1957-1959), when the Minang 
officers that supported PRRI choosing to leave 
their positions. After PRRI was defeated, anti-PKI 
wing in military office in Jakarta started to clean 
their organization from the existence of pro-PKI 
apparatus (Kahin, 2005, p. 369). 
According to my interview with one of 
the traditional elites in the Minang, apart from 
the debate of whether PRRI is a separatism or 
regionalism movement, or who made use whom 
in the case, the apparent thing is that issue later 
had brought difficult position for the Minang in 
Jakarta’s political contestation. He said, 
There seemed to be misunderstanding 
with national army. They thought the 
Minang rebelled (wanted to separate from 
Indonesia). It is not rebellion. It is a protest 
to demand for justice. Unfortunately, the 
response of the national army, led by Yani, 
was too strict. Minang had to bear the 
consequence until Suharto ended his reign 
in 1998. 5
He gave an example, in which military 
officers and bureaucrats that were from the Minang 
in Jakarta were excluded for further promotion of 
their career. Even, for quite long time, military 
commander in West Sumatran Division was always 
filled with Javanese. Ricklefs identified that 60 to 
80 percent of army officers were Javanese, whereas 
the ethnic group comprised only 45 percent of 
Indonesian population (2001, p. 320). Instead 
of intensifying their movement, this had forced 
local elites in Padang to be very careful, moreover 
with the Soeharto presidency after Revolution era 
(during New Order). Jakarta only chose those of 
the Minang officers who were successful to show 
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their loyalty to the national government. Jakarta 
only wanted to make use these elites to handle 
potential subversive movement in West Sumatra 
(Kahin, 2005, p. 367). Yet, this meant high cost 
for West Sumatra, because later their interest was 
placed secondary than Jakarta’s by those local 
elites. Of course, such an approach led to internal 
tension amongst the Minang in West Sumatra 
(Kahin, 2005, pp. 429-441).
In fact, PRRI is not only about the politics of 
elites. It had implication on politics at the grass root 
level, especially dealing with interethnic relations. 
In the context of Padang, amongst ethnic groups 
that were mostly influenced by PRRI are Minang, 
Javanese and Chinese. The identification of the 
national government and PKI with Javanese had 
encouraged the rise of sentiment against Javanese 
amongst Minang. The existence of Ahmad Yani, 
a military commander of Diponegoro Division 
in Semarang, Central Java, and other Indonesian 
army members, who were mostly Javanese, in 
Padang including, in an attack on 17 April 1958 
(Colombijn, 2006, p. 169) had been a clear token 
for Javanese’s role in Padang turmoil. Referring 
to Ricklefs (1981, p. 250-251), Amal (1986, p. 
93-94) and Leirissa (1991, p. 212-217), Javanese 
army was known to be very mean and attack under 
Ahmad Yani’s commander had killed thousands of 
people and forced the other thousands of them to 
leave West Sumatra to reside at the other islands 
through merantau (migration). It was just because 
General Nasution lobbied the government, then 
Ahmad Yani’s army was withdrawn from Padang 
and being replaced with military commander from 
Siliwangi Division (West Java) that was known to 
be more ‘humanist’ than Diponegoro Division. He 
said, 
There was no cultural approach (under 
yani’s commander). After about 3,5 years 
of battle, Nasution came to Padang and 
instructed all the army and PRRI struggler 
to leave the battle field. 6
Yet, Minang is not monolithic. The apparent 
complexities in Minang can be seen for instance 
through the division of adat and Moslem scholars. 
In the case of PRRI, for instance, there were some 
people who were active in the movement, but there 
were also some other who was not. Some of them 
even took part in pro-communism in PKI. Dealing 
with this, some people believe that Javanese 
took crucial role in spreading PKI’s ideology in 
Padang through those that migrated to Padang 
since colonial era. 7 Kahin (2005, p. 19) mentions 
those who had close relations with Javanese were 
usually from adat community. Adat and Javanese 
seemed to have intersecting interest in this case 
because adat had been long time neglected by 
Minang Muslim scholars since Padri war, in spite 
of the peace agreement between them that resulted 
in the Minang principles of “adat basandi syara’, 
syara basandi kitabullah”. Meanwhile, Javanese 
as new comers saw that adat and Muslim scholars’ 
friction was an opportunity to gain support from 
adat community. Martens (2012, p. 17) and Kahin 
(2005, p. 394) assert that the Islamic people of 
West Sumatra that were affiliated to Masyumi had 
been in diametrical distance with Javanese that 
was suspected to promote communism in West 
Sumatra. The suspicion seems to be justifiable with 
the fact that PKI-Jawa had been equally influential 
to PKI-Padang Panjang, led by Tan Malaka, in 
organizing communist movement in West Sumatra 
(Kahin, 2005, pp. 17-20, Benda and McVey, 2009, 
p. 31). 
However, unlike Javanese, or other people 
that supported Javanese (Colombijn, 2006, p. 185), 
Chinese did not experience attack or discrediting. 
Being aware that the Minang had been keeping 
the distance with Chinese during the colonial era, 
there seemed to be a change in the way Chinese 
responding to the issue. In PRRI movement, some 
Chinese preferred to be in the side of Minang 
(pro-PRRI). On the other hand, it is apparent 
that Minang had high resistance to Javanese and 
anybody that appeared to be pro-Java, which 
means to be pro-national government, which was 
dominated by leftist wing. There were, of course, 
some of the Chinese that preferred to be neutral. 
As a Chinese man I interviewed asserts, “Chinese 
preferred not to be in either side because it would 
lead them to further difficulties.” 8 The most 
important thing of his involvement in PRRI for 
him was to save the kampung residents surrounded 
his environment. He confirms the involvement of 
some Chinese and Nias people in PRRI movement. 
In order to differentiate Chinese that got involved 
in PRRI or merely being a member of kampung 
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security, the man explains the people used a ribbon 
as a sign. Once an army approached them meant to 
capture them, the man says, they could easily argue 
that they were not part of PRRI. Otherwise, they 
would be in danger. 
The man’s explanation about Chinese 
participation in PRRI movement enriches what 
Erniwati said about Chinese during Revolution 
Era, which she claims as very safe. As Erniwati 
(2011, p. 97) argues, there were many Chinese that 
were involved in PRRI that supported Andalas 
university students, which also supported PRRI, 
by providing bus to transport to the university 
during that hard times. Amongst them is Oei Ho 
Tjeng (Erniwati, 2011, p. 97, Yusra, 1997, p. 135). 
In fact, there were some Chinese that chose not 
to get involved in either side, clarifying Brown’s 
argument of Chinese’s ambivalence (2011, p. 
110-114). In that context of time and space, 
Chinese’s ambivalence relatively helped them to 
avoid attack either from military or from PRRI. 
The fact that some Chinese men were involved in 
PRRI movement helped Chinese to gain protection 
from PRRI during the increasing tension of 
politics (Erniwati, 2011, p. 97). Equally, the fact 
that military established its office in Pondok, and 
sometime was able to force Chinese to provide 
truck to transport military officers to outer regions, 
also had saved Chinese from military attack. 
After PRRI era ended, military moved Chinese 
that dwelled in sub-urban to the urban area, like 
Padang (Colombijn, 2006, p. 184). The politics 
and economic development, I guess, is one of the 
encouraging factors of the policy. 
In addition to politics and economy issue, 
Chinese also had to face administrative stuff 
related to citizenship status. Although this did not 
have direct correlation with PRRI, this had been 
a crucial issue, which brought another problem 
to Chinese after PRRI movement was cleared up. 
The problem of citizenship administration arose 
because People Republic of China acclaimed that 
anybody born with Chinese descent was recognized 
as the citizen of the country. Meanwhile, the 
Indonesian government based on Citizenship Law 
Year 1958 asserted that anybody born in Indonesia 
were Indonesian citizen (Erniwati, 2011, p. 90, 
Suryadinata, 1994, p. 41 and Wibowo, 1999, 
pp. 107-110). The Indonesian government later 
offered three options for Chinese to decide their 
citizenship status, namely to be Dutch’s citizen, 
People Republic of China’s, or Indonesia’s. 
Later, the Indonesian government decided 
to claim Chinese that did not chose to be Dutch 
citizen as Indonesian citizen (Mackie, 1975, pp. 
9-10). In fact, things did not run that easy. A 
Chinese informant I interviewed said, “Those who 
chose to be People Republic of China’s citizen 
were deported to China by ships with the financial 
support from the Indonesian government.” 9 The 
man almost chose to return to China. However, his 
parent reminded him that there might be nobody 
that will recognize him because his relatives 
were not able to be identified anymore. He finally 
cancelled his intention to come back to China. 
On the other hand, there were still many Chinese 
people that were administered to (illegally) have 
dua-citizen. Based on Government Decree No. 1 
Year 1950, the government finally firmly required 
Chinese to choose one only citizenship (Erniwati, 
2011, p. 91, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, 
1980, pp. 63-67). In Padang, it is claimed that 
99.08 percent of Chinese were noted to choose 
Indonesian citizenship (Erniwati, 2011, p. 92, 
Sofwan, 1987, p. 88). It seems that, in terms of 
administration, at least one problem was resolved. 
Yet, as the man has informed me, another bigger 
problem revived when PRRI issue was resolved 
and Indonesia entering a new phase of anti-
PKI movement in 1960s to 1970s. 10 Next part 
discusses Minang and Chinese relationship in New 
Order context, which was begun with anti-PKI 
movement in the mid-1960s and continued up to 
1998 reformasi.
YEARS FULL OF OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL 
TENSION: NEW ORDER (1965/1966-1998)
When PRRI era ended and Padang entered new 
era of anti-PKI movement, the relationship between 
the Minang and Chinese changed dramatically. 
Now, it is not only Javanese that gained communist 
labelling. The same experience also happened to 
Chinese. Exclusion and discrimination against 
Chinese dominated the figure of state’s politics 
of ethnic, which inhibited the way people in the 
grass root built their relationship with Chinese. 
Therefore, it is not exaggerating if it is said that 
the end of PRRI never means the end of disaster. 
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Padang movement to anti-PKI era in the mid-
1960s, which means the beginning of New Order, 
even means worse situation for the Minang 
and Chinese in Padang, firstly identified by the 
furthering distance between the two ethnic groups, 
and secondly the furthering access for the Minang 
to political resources in West Sumatra and Jakarta, 
as well as the more apparent discrimination against 
Chinese in Padang economy, politics and policy. 
This part discusses briefly anti-PKI movement in 
Padang, New Order, and the construction of the 
Minang and Chinese relationship in Padang in that 
era. 
As argued earlier, although PRRI had been 
defeated, this never meant victory for PKI in 
Indonesian politics. Anti-PKI wing in military 
office kept their eyes to bar PKI manoeuvre in 
political stage. In Padang, preceding anti-PKI 
movement between 1961-1966, some political 
and military elites initiated the replacement of 
civil and military officers in Padang with anti-
PKI officers in order to balance PKI’s influence 
in policy making. Up to 1966, leftist politicians 
were recorded to dominate legislature body, 
government office, and military institution (Kahin, 
2005, p. 387). Untung, leader of 30 September 
1965 event, and Abdul Latief were amongst leftist 
military officers that were ever posted in West 
Sumatra, and brought significant influence in West 
Sumatran military office. Meanwhile, Sapoetro 
was PNI leader that dominate legislature body 
who was known to be lenient to PKI and other 
leftist organization (Kahin, 2005, p. 387). In order 
to cease further domination of leftist politicians, 
Ahmad Yani strived to promote non-PKI officer to 
lead West Sumatra. Kahin (2005, p. 367) identifies 
that Ahmad Yani, based on Lieutenant General 
AJ Mokoginta’s suggestion, pointed out Colonel 
Poniman, a Javanese military officer, as a chief 
of the military staffs in Padang. Later, Poniman 
was promoted to be chief commander in West 
Sumatran military region that also included areas 
of Riau and Jambi. This policy was strengthened 
with the appointment of West Sumatran governor 
in 1966, namely Harun Zain, a Jakarta born 
Minang intellectual and former rector of Andalas 
University, which was known to be non-leftist, to 
neutralize West Sumatran political climate. At first, 
there was a proposal to put a Javanese in governor 
position to squeeze Sapoetro who won election 
in parliament. However, Poniman insisted to put 
Minang in governor position in order to minimize 
the potential of ethnic fragmentation. At last, 
Harun Zain was mandated to be West Sumatran 
governor. Under Harun Zain’s rule, slowly but 
sure West Sumatra rehabilitated itself before New 
Order’s administration, as well as returned its 
access and resources by replacing non-Minang 
especially Javanese in government offices.
When 30 September 1965 event exploded 
in Java, Padang was actually in quite stable 
condition, in the sense that there was no violence 
against PKI, although resistance towards PKI was 
already high. Post-30 September 1965 event, the 
situation in Padang, and some other cities in West 
Sumatra, like Painan and Padang Panjang, was 
also quite conducive. People heard about the six 
military-general killing by PKI, which was led by 
Untung, but they chose to waiting for Soekarno’s 
instruction to respond to the event (Kahin, 2005, 
pp. 384-396). Therefore, there was no particular 
reaction from people from any political affiliation. 
Jim Siegel’s interview transcript, as Kahin (2005, 
p. 380) cited, revealed that people chose not to 
react, “because (we) do not have relationship with 
them (I assume the word “them” refers to PKI or 
politicians in Java or 30 September 1965 event)”.11 
A similar response can be seen in later political 
events like anti-Chinese violence in Reformasi era 
and Chinese traditional gate destruction in 2011-
2012.12
However, about three weeks after 30 
September 1965 event, KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Indonesia) and HMI (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Indonesia), two leading student 
organizations in Padang, initiated a massive anti-
communist movement. It is not clear who initiated 
the establishment of the organization, but rumor 
has it that the organizations have relationship 
with New Order. Such a movement was quickly 
followed with other youth organizations to conduct 
sweeping against PKI members and anybody that 
was suspected to have affiliation with PKI (Kahin, 
2005, p. 380). PKI committees, legislature and 
governor assistant were reported to be captured 
by those organizations and were devoted to mass 
to get beaten until they died. In addition to PKI 
(registered) members, the next target of anti-
Laila K. A., Eric H., Farsijana A. - The Position of Minang-Chinese Relationship
89
PKI sweeping were farmers, labourers,13 and 
Chinese.14 My informant in Padang told me that, 
unfortunately, those included to be the target of 
anti-PKI cleansing were mostly innocent people. 
It was not rare that only because the people were 
given farming tools (cangkul), they then were 
listed to be anti-PKI sweeping target.15  Some 
others even were killed informally, which means 
that they were not identified in military list. 
Yet, as Kahin (2005, p. 390) argues, anti-PKI 
movement in Padang, and West Sumatra in general, 
was not as terrible as in Java and Bali. Amongst 
areas in Sumatra that was noted to experience 
severe anti-PKI mass killing was North Sumatra, 
in which nearly 300.000 people that works in 
farming were killed (Kahin, 2005, pp. 282-294). 
Kahin’s argument was strengthened with my 
Chinese informant’s statement, in which anti PKI 
movement was not that terrible in Padang. He says 
that the most suffering experience he had to deal 
with is the takeover of Chinese assets, including 
schools and cultural buildings. Amongst Chinese 
assets being takeover, he mentions, 
Included Hembing School, which is a 
language education school near Chinese 
temple (kelenteng), Tsing Hua School 
building in Parak Kalam, China consulate 
building in Jalan Cokro, and Eng Tsi School 
in 1967.” 16
He adds, 
“There was no severe mass killing like in 
Java, but the takeover of Chinese assets 
and the banning of Chinese symbols and 
identity, including in naming (was enough 
to make Chinese suffered).” 17
Nevertheless, this does not mean that that 
asset takeover and Chinese identity cleansing do 
not bring any impact to the Minang and Chinese 
relationship. An apparent result is, as an informant 
explains, because of the prohibition to expose 
Chinese identity, Chinese in Padang gets uprooted 
from their culture and language, which actually 
means a great lost not only for Chinese, but also 
for Indonesia, too. Currently, he estimates that 
only about 30 percent of Chinese in Padang that 
are able to speak basic Mandarin, not the advance 
one. In fact, it is found that mastering Mandarin is 
crucial in current Indonesian economic, political 
and social development. In daily social relations, 
anti-PKI movement that was manifested in anti-
Chinese policy also means the start for further 
ethnic fragmentation in Padang. 
Being asked about why the Minang acted so 
to Chinese, he says it might be because the Minang 
equated Chinese with PKI. Meanwhile, he argues 
that Chinese was actually only being bakiak, means 
to be PKI charity giver, instead of active members or 
supporters. Giving charity for him is different with 
being active members. Therefore, he refuses the 
allegation that Chinese as the same with PKI. For 
Chinese, he adds, their closeness to PKI activists 
was merely because of collegial (persahabatan), 
instead of ideological. He realizes that the equation 
of Chinese with PKI arose because the spreading 
of communism in Indonesia was inseparable from 
communism in China. Meanwhile, China as a state, 
and Chinese as ethnic group, for him, is totally 
different entity. Terrible treatment to Chinese at 
the time, for him, is also a representation of most 
Indonesians’ view that Chinese was foreigner. 
This is irony, because, he asserts, as many other 
“ordinary” Indonesian citizen, Chinese also pays 
tax and even they pay higher than those “ordinary” 
citizen. Viewing Chinese as foreigner, for him, 
therefore, is against citizen equality principle. He, 
personally, disrespects such a policy by not paying 
the assigned amount of tax. 18
When being traced further, the identification 
of Chinese with communism is also inseparable 
from the fact that in national level PKI became 
the only party that protected Chinese business and 
community (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 319) in the midst of 
hard political situation in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. As Martens (2012, pp. 161-162) asserts, for 
the protection Chinese gained from PKI, Chinese 
had to pay particular fee to PKI that was used to 
fund the operation of PKI and Palace (Soekarno’s 
administration). On the other hand, Chinese was 
given particular concession to supply raw materials 
for national needs, as well as to undergo import 
to supply machineries. The mutual relationship 
as such was well read by the Minang not only 
as an economic relation but more importantly as 
a political stance. This reminded the Minang of 
Chinese’s view towards colonialism, in which 
colonialism was seen as a field of business for them 
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instead of a practice of oppression the Minang 
suffered from. 
In addition to such a historical experience 
during colonial era, the courage to get involved 
in anti-PKI movement among the Minang is 
inseparable from the considerable support from the 
state that initiated the movement as a response to 
30 September 1965 event, later called G30S/PKI, 
to clean the state from the influence of communism. 
19 Locally, anti-PKI movement in Padang was 
also mentioned to have correlation with Islamic 
fundamentalism, which saw communism as an 
antithesis of Islam, embraced by most Minang. 
The establishment of Badan Kontak Perjuangan 
Ummat Islam (BKPUI) and the replacement 
of MTKAAM (Majlis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat 
Alam Minangkabau) that was known to have 
close attachment to Soekarno, with LKAAM 
(Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau) 
were amongst the steps to encourage social 
organizations that affiliated to Islam to support 
the anti-PKI movement in Padang (Kahin, 2005, 
p. 386). BKPUI and LKAAM with the support of 
Poniman were those that rejected Sapoetro, a leftist 
Javanese, to be West Sumatran governor (Kahin, 
2005, p. 387). Another step was by establishing 
KAMI and HMI in universities in Padang, as 
mentioned earlier, to operate anti-PKI movement. 
Amongst the steps KAMI and HMI took is to 
force the replacement of nagari officers that were 
suspected to be leftist and PKI supporters with 
thee anti-PKI ones (Kahin, 2005, p. 387). Some 
other youth organizations demanded for the delay 
of trading concession to Chinese and the kicking 
out of Chinese from West Sumatra. Soon, West 
Sumatra’s export, which mainly consisted of coffee 
and pepper, decreased about 10 percent from 3,717 
to 3,369 ton (Kahin, 2005, p. 392). 
 Although anti-PKI movement did not kill 
Chinese much, like the one happened in Java and 
Bali, this did not mean to bring insignificant impact 
for further Minang and Chinese relationship. 
Communist labeling in 1960s-1970s posed a new 
challenge to Chinese to be accepted by Minang 
in Padang,20 after they could resolve the pro-
colonial label attached to them in colonial era 
(Erniwati, 2011, p. 74, Zed, 1998, pp. 124-125) 
by participating in PRRI (Erniwati, 2011, p. 97). 
Gerakan  Kambuik (plundering) that was deemed 
to be a token for Minang’s resistance to Chinese 
post-1945 independence (Erniwati, 2011, p. 74, 
Zed, 1998, pp. 124-125) was successfully ceased 
during the chaotic situation in PRRI era. PRRI 
even protected Chinese from plundering during 
the era of military intimidation (Colombijn, 2006, 
p. 183). When Padang moved to anti-PKI era and 
entered New Order, the situation turned worse and 
resulted in furthering distance between the Minang 
and Chinese. A Chinese informant says, regarding 
the Chinese identity cleansing and asset takeover, 
There was no crucial protest from Chinese 
that could be posed. Somehow, Chinese was 
fear. They rather chose not to react to avoid 
further interethnic clash. 21
Dealing with this, ironically, the Minang 
seemed not to realize that their support for anti-
PKI movement in Padang at the moment actually 
meant a support for the newly established ruler, 
namely Soeharto in an era called New Order, 
which later trapped the Minang to another difficult 
problem, namely political suspicion, exclusion 
and marginalization, due to past experience of the 
Minang in PRRI rebellion. Practically, the state’s 
policy for cleansing PKI, which was conducted 
with the support of some the Minang residents, 
therefore, did not bring any benefit for Minang. In 
spite of amnesty given by Soekarno in 1961, during 
Soeharto’s New Order, the state kept putting low 
trust to Minang that its leading figure were always 
put under the state’s monitoring and the strategic 
positions in bureaucracy and military were granted 
to those who were loyal and could “serve” the 
national government. Kahin (2005, p. 403) asserts 
that the Minang elite was forced to support the 
state’s party (Golkar) and deployed only figures 
that were loyal to the state. Daling with this, an 
informant says,
Living in New Order was very difficult for 
the Minang. It is unlike their past in prior 
and post-independence when there were 
many Minang intellectuals got involved 
in founding the state. Political career 
promotion in New Order was something 
rare. The Minang is like terjepit (getting 
pressed). 22 
Therefore, it can be said that both the Minang 
Laila K. A., Eric H., Farsijana A. - The Position of Minang-Chinese Relationship
91
and Chinese equally faced difficult situation during 
the administration of Soeharto in New Order. Both 
ethnic groups also looked very careful to make a 
deal with Jakarta’s elites. While Minang chose to 
adjust with what Soeharto wanted (Kahin, 2005, p. 
400), like to win Golkar in West Sumatra (Kahin, 
2005, p. 404), to adopt the idea of pemerintahan 
desa (village government) that the Minang looked 
like as Java in spite of the existence of nagari in 
Minang governance system (Kahin, 2005, p. 407), 
and to post local elites that were able to guarantee 
the clearness of West Sumatra from PRRI rebellion 
potential in West Sumatran bureaucracy and 
military strategic positions in provincial and 
district level like Azwar Anas (Kahin, 2005, pp. 
409-412), Chinese chose not to get involved 
directly in politics, in order to survive. Citing Amal 
(1992, p. 193), Kahin (2005, 2005, p. 400) asserts 
that such a Minang strategy is close to the Minang 
pepatah petitih (proverb), namely takuik di ujuang 
badia, lari kapangka badia (Indonesian: takut di 
ujung bedil, lari ke pangkal bedil), which means 
that when people do not have any more power to 
rebel, adjusting with those that are more powerful 
is suggested in order to survive. That is why, in 
spite of the pressing situation Minang has to face 
during New Order, there were always Minang 
elites that were successful to take part in Soeharto’s 
ministries. Azwar Anas, Abdul Latief, Emil Salim, 
and Hasan Basri Durin are amongst those elites 
that were quite influential in Soeharto’s ruling 
government. Similarly, in spite of its limited role 
and access to politics, Chinese was also noted to be 
able to live side by side with Minang. In the early 
period of New Order administration, a Chinese 
man, namely Oei Ho Tjong that was known to 
ever be the supporter of Republic (Soekarno) in 
PRRI era by supplying weapons to the Indonesian 
Republic’s military (which was pro-PKI ar the 
moment), was even noted to be chosen as LKAAM 
member (Colombijn, 2006, p. 184, Kahin, 1979, 
p. 225).
Yet, in daily life in grass root level, both ethnic 
groups remained in distancing relationship. In later 
New Order era, tension was even more apparent. 
Amongst the issues that always encouraged 
Minang and Chinese’s tension were religion and 
economy. Based on a story told in interview, 
there was a case, in which a Chinese man was 
alleged to approach a Minang female student 
through unregistered marriage to persuade the 
girl to convert to Christianity. In the Minang, it 
was considered as blasphemy, which encouraged 
dispute between the Minang and Chinese in the 
mid-1980s. 23 Another case, as a Chinese man told, 
“…is the unwritten policy of the city government 
to ban Chinese to operate their trading stalls in 
Pasar Raya.” 24 The government suggested Chinese 
to centre their economic activities in Pasar Tanah 
Kongsi, which was smaller in scale and further 
from the city centre than Pasar Raya. Instead of 
killing Chinese’s economy, to my observation, the 
policy encouraged Chinese to open new trading 
spots through developing stores (ruko) surrounding 
Pasar Raya and Pondok. 
Another Chinese man also told me that 
Chinese was not allowed to reside in village and 
sub-district. They may only reside in district area. 
Indeed, this hindered them to interact more widely 
with society. As a result, Chinese’s residence was 
cantered in the city. As argued earlier, interestingly, 
although relationship building between the Minang 
and Chinese never run easy, direct clash or violent 
conflict was hard to explode. As Zainal Arifin says, 
typically the Minang was not interested to conflict, 
except the one that related to religion (Islam). In 
spite of the hard problems they have to face, they 
usually did not respond to the issues with physical 
violence. Arifin clarifies, 
Minang basically did not reject Chinese, 
but it could not be said as well that the 
Minang welcome and accept them. As long 
as Chinese do not undermine the Minang’s 
principle, Islam, the Minang may not take 
into account the existence of Chinese in 
Padang very seriously. 25 
This makes us clear that during New Order 
although both ethnic groups equally faced the 
political hardship, but both were also not engaged 
in their daily relationship. 
 
NEW SPACE (AND CHALLENGES) OPENED: 
REFORMASI ERA (1998 ONWARDS)
Similar to the transition from Revolution era 
to New Order, things changed dramatically in the 
transition of New Order era to Reformasi. While 
in the transition of Revolution era to New Order 
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Chinese experienced rejection after acceptance, 
in Reformasi era, Chinese gained a new space 
in public participation after a long period of 
oppression. However, it is widely known that 
Chinese have to pay very expensive for freedom 
they gain since Reformasi era. Chinese had been 
placed as scapegoat for the economic crisis 
that preceded reformasi. Official statements of 
Soeharto’s ministries, like Adi Sasono and Rudini, 
contributed to the image making that Chinese was 
the cause, or at least the catalysts, of the crisis. 
The minority Chinese was alleged to dominate 
Indonesian economy causing a great disparity in 
Indonesian prosperity (Wibowo, 2001, p. 130). 
The statement that 3 percent Chinese dominated 
70 percent Indonesian economy (Aditjondro, 1998, 
p. 8) strongly triggered public anger. Meanwhile, 
Soharto’s family and crony’s domination was 
never seriously mentioned (and properly tackled) 
in the case. Soeharto never confessed (let alone 
asked for apology) that the crisis arose because 
of his failure to manage Indonesian economy and 
rather used Chinese’s domination in economy as an 
object to blame. In the midst of economic hardship, 
Wibowo (2001, p. 129), cited Subiyanto (2000, 
p. 3), mentions that there was a three-star general 
that stated, “There were “traitors” that tried to 
reduce the value of rupiah—an apparent reference 
to Sofyan Wanandi, a Chinese businessman, who 
refused to support the Cinta Rupiah campaign.” 
With such a situation, some areas were successfully 
provoked to attack Chinese. Jakarta, Medan, 
Surabaya, Surakarta, Semarang and Makasar are 
amongst the cities where anti-Chinese violence 
was severe. Killing, plundering, burning, and even 
women mocking and gang-raping are amongst 
attacks Chinese experienced. At last, Soeharto was 
forced to resign from his presidency on May 1998 
and this ended New Order’s administration.
 What is interesting about economic crisis 
that was related anti-Chinese violence in Padang? 
In spite of the fact Chinese was frightened and 
social tension was unavoidable, given the news 
about anti-Chinese violence from Jakarta, as well 
as rumors about attack to Chinese from Painan, 
Tiku and Silungkang, as a big city that was 
populated by a significant number of Chinese, 
violence against Chinese was not exploded in 
Padang. Students’ protest was rather focused on 
Soeharto’s politics that was believed to have strong 
relations to local politics (Kahin, 2005, p. 424), 
instead of on ethnic politics and disparity issues. 
A Chinese informant admits that after the news 
of violence against Chinese in Jakarta and other 
big cities in Indonesia was heard in Padang, the 
situation in Padang was a bit frightening. He adds 
that most Chinese were worried about their safety. 
Yet, in his estimation, this only lasted for a month. 
He explains, 
People started to think that economic crisis 
that was followed violence against Chinese was 
Jakarta’s problem, and not theirs. Both Minang and 
Chinese agree that it was useless to get involved in 
the problem, the informant underlines.26 
Accordingly, the frightening situation was 
replaced with cooperation between the Minang 
and Chinese in guarding Padang security. Another 
female Chinese informant says, she was so 
thankful to her fellow the Minang that protected 
her during reformasi, therefore she and her 
family felt saved. 27 In addition to the political 
explanation, in which the Minang and Chinese 
did not feel that they were part of the problem, 
Erniwati says that economic factor also played 
crucial role in the minimized potential of ethnic 
violence. She explains, apart from the fact that 
Chinese was the strongest competitor for the 
Minang in trading, at the same time they were also 
their most important trading partner. Therefore, as 
Erniwati clarifies, the Minang believed that ruining 
Chinese’s business will mean ruing Minang’s 
economy, as well. 28 The fact that Padang did not 
experience violence against Chinese in reformasi 
era seems to reflect their lesson learning from 
their experience in anti-PKI movement prior the 
rise of New Order, in which attack on Chinese’s 
business had brought crucial impact on Padang 
local economy, which was noted to decrease about 
30 percent. The Minang, on the other hand, looked 
more considerate and careful to have a deal with 
Chinese in early reformasi era. 
 Chinese involvement in politics also 
increased with the more opened opportunity for 
participation since reformasi era. And, though 
political party and practice politics, inclusive 
relationship between Minang and Chinese is also 
enabled. Golkar, PDIP, PAN, PKB and Demokrat 
are amongst parties that are popular amongst 
Laila K. A., Eric H., Farsijana A. - The Position of Minang-Chinese Relationship
93
Chinese. Yohanes Lukman, Feryanto Gani and 
Albert Lukman are amongst Chinese prominent 
figures in Padang that have crucial roles in Padang 
politics. An important note about the political 
involvement of Chinese that is important to 
consider, as Erniwati (2011, pp. 175-193) identifies, 
is the role of kongsi (HTT and HBT). As Erniwati 
(2011, p. 176) argues, although kongsi never claims 
itself to be affiliated in particular political parties, 
its role in encouraging Chinese to get involved in 
politics is significant. This is unlike kongsi in New 
Order, in which kongsi chose to keep distance 
from direct political practice. In this case, the role 
of tuako (kongsi leader) is determining. However, 
this does not mean that tuako direct the political 
orientation of his members (directly). Although 
tuako’s political choice might influence kongsi 
members’ political choice, this does not mean that 
difference is not possible. In HTT, for instance, it 
is known that Feryanto Gani, HTT’s tuako, was 
part of Demokrat Party’s campaign team in 2004 
election. At the same time, Albert Lukman, HTT’s 
treasury, sits in PDIP’s board member. In 2009-
2014, Albert Lukman was even elected to be the 
member of West Sumatra Provincial legislature. 
In Erniwati’s view (2011, p. 184), the enabled 
difference of political choice in HTT makes HTT 
looks more democratic than HBT. This also reflects 
a more effective and strong HTT leadership. 
 In spite of the good progress in terms of 
political recognition of Chinese since reformasi 
era, there is still challenge Chinese has to face 
internally and externally. Internally, Chinese 
has to face the increasing competition between 
kongsi. An NGO activist I interviewed confirms 
the competing tendency of the two kongsi to get 
“closer” to local politicians, which in his opinion 
might not bring further benefit for Chinese. 
In his view, there are still areas that need for 
response from policy making that still need for 
internal consolidation of Chinese, instead of their 
fragmentation, like poverty reduction, justice 
struggle and human right advocacy. 29 Externally, 
Chinese still faces allegation that they collaborates 
with local politicians, merely to gain facilities 
to run their business. The issue of the close 
relationship between Fauzi Bahar, former mayor 
of Padang, with several Chinese elites, in social 
media discussion is often related to the consession 
Chinese gains to build business center in Pondok, 
like hotel, restaurant, and the most controversial 
one is bar.  This indicates that the acceptance and 
recognition of Chinese in Padang have not yet been 
full, and there is still great wall between Minang 
and Chinese to have a fair and open communication 
and inclusion. As such, although reformasi has 
brought new space for Chinese to get involved 
in policy making and gain political and social 
recognition in Padang, it brings other challenges 
for Minang in terms of internal consolidation and 
external inclusion. 
CONCLUSION
From the aforementioned discussion shows 
the dynamics in the relationship of the Chinese-
Minang within the interethnic relations in Padang, 
is often inseparable from the political situation. 
In the colonial era, the colonial government 
policy that classified societies into three classes, 
influenced much the way the Minang saw their 
relationship with the Chinese. In that period, the 
Chinese was identified with colonialism, so that 
the Minang kept their distance with the Chinese. 
When Indonesia gained its independence, 
the Minang turned its position to be the first 
class, and the Chinese as the second class. In fact, 
independence was not the answer for everything. 
The Minang was forced to face another hardship 
in terms of having relations with the national 
government, dealing with the economic and 
political inequality issues. The Minang’s response 
to take part in PRRI as a protest to the national 
government, in fact, had brought Minang to a harder 
situation. At that moment, the Minang relationship 
with the Chinese turned into a harmonious relation. 
There were many Chinese people supported 
the Minang, for instance through giving them 
protection from the military intimidation. 
The hardship, in fact, did not cease even 
until Suharto took over the power and governed 
Indonesia under his New Order regime. The 
Minang was excluded from accessing military 
and political career promotion during New Order. 
Exception was found only in those who were able 
to show their full support to Suharto. Yet, the sweet 
moment of relationship with Chinese in Revolution 
era did not continue in New Order era, for the 
identification of Chinese as PKI. The relationship 
Humaniora, Vol. 28, No. 1 Februari 2016
94
of Minang and Chinese was getting more difficult 
with the massive discriminatory policy imposed by 
New Order government.
However, the Minang (and Chinese) are not 
the passive recipients of their ‘political’ fate. Both 
ethnic groups seem to learn much from their past. 
What we find out during the reformasi era in 1998 
in which the Minang and the Chinese avoided direct 
clashes, in spite of the intense violence against 
Chinese in other big cities in Indonesia, shows us 
how both the ethnic groups made their experience 
in their past as a good lesson. The Minang had 
suffered a lot from breaking Chinese’s economy 
in early New Order era, because empirically, the 
Minang had mutual dependence with the Chinese 
in trading. Similarly, the Chinese tried to be more 
aware of what happened to the Minang period 
to period, which is not always easy to handle. 
Disregarding the strong provocation, Minang and 
Chinese were successful to avoid violent conflicts 
during the early periods of political transition in 
1998. 
Tracing the Minang-Chinese’s relationship in 
Padang history helps us understand the interethnic 
dynamics, as well as the politics behind the 
construction of that relationship. However, apart 
from the apparent role of the state and political 
elites in constructing interethnic relationship; 
society in grass root level is not always passive 
towards their fate. Society is also an active actor 
that takes part in interethnic relationship construct. 
Padang in reformasi era has given us a good lesson 
on this.  And, this is also part of politics. 
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(Endnotes)
1  Interview on 17 May 2014 in Padang.
2 Interview with a Minang prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.
3 Interview with a Minang prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.. 
4 Interview with a Minang prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.
5 Interview with a Minang prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.
6 Interview with a Minang prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.
7 Interview with a Minang prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.
8 Interview with a Chinese prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang..
9 Interview on 17 May 2014 in Padang.
10 Interview on 17 May 2014 in Padang.
11 Jim Siegel’s interview with Nourmatias, ex-member 
of PKI, 8 August 1988.
12 It seems to be Minang typical not to interfere 
problems that are not their own. 
13 Interview with Minang leading figure on 17 May 
2014 in Padang.
14 Interview with a Chinese prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.
15 Based on interview with Minang leading figure on 
17 May 2014 in Padang.
16 Interview with a Chinese prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang. .
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17 Interview with Interview with a Chinese prominent 
figure on 20 May 2014 in Padang.
18 Interview with a Chinese prominent figure on 20 
May 2014 in Padang.
19 G30S/PKI refers to PKI movement where six 
military generals were killed by PKI leading 
activists given the long conflict of interest and power 
contestation in Indonesian politics since colonial era. 
20 According to Interview with a Chinese prominent 
figure on 20 May 2014 in Padang.  
21 Interview Interview with a Chinese prominent figure 
on 20 May 2014 in Padang.
22 Interview with Minang leading figure on 17 May 
2014 in Padang .
23 Interview with aMinang informant on May 2014 in 
Padang.
24 Interview with a Chinese informant on May 2014 in 
Pasang.
25 Interview on 15 May 2014 in Padang.
26 Interview on 11 May 2014 in Padang
27 Interview on 23 November 2013 in Padang.
28 Interview on June 2010 in Padang.
29 Interview on June 2010 in Padang.
